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Abstract 
 
While matter clearly matters to organization theory, its absence from the study of 
organizational ethics is striking. Despite the obdurate materiality of the workplace, critical 
scholarship on organizations and morality sees ethics as interpersonal, subjective and 
embodied. Organizations, meanwhile, are characterised by moral anomie and dysfunction. 
This paper advances our understanding of the material entanglements of organizational 
morality, drawing on the science and technology studies inflected study of markets to show 
how moral orders arise in dialectic between the social and the material. It argues that moral 
orders are entangled in the material infrastructures of organizations. Its empirical case is the 
founding and development of a small-company focused stock exchange, OFEX, launched in 
London in 1995, accessed through elite interviews and documentary work. The paper seeks to 
develop our understanding of morality in critical organization studies, to further defend the 
Weberian notion of ‘ethics of office’ by emphasising the sociomaterial dimension of 
organizational morality, and to contribute to an ongoing renaissance of the study of morality 
as a sociological phenomenon. There are implications for managers and engaged scholars 
alike. 
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How ‘matter matters’ for morality: the case of a stock exchange 
Introduction 
 
‘We did what we thought was right…We should do what is right for the market’  
(Jonathan Jenkins, OFEX chief executive) 
Current scholarship on organizations and ethics is often distrustful of organizational 
rationality.1 Critically minded scholars have pointed out the morally alienating nature of 
institutional formal-rational calculation (Bauman, 1989; MacIntyre, 1992), with its toxic 
organizational cultures (Brannan, 2017) and self-justificatory narratives (Collins and Wray-
Bliss, 2005; Whittle and Mueller, 2012). Organizational norms are corrosive: Jackall (2010) 
suggests that ‘bosses’ determine ‘moral rules in use,’ and that subordinates must simply 
conform. As the corollary of this position, contemporary organization theory has increasingly 
understood positive ethics as an individual challenge. Organizational anomie is set against a 
‘socially contingent and self-reflexive’ process of individual self-constitution through ethics 
(Ailon, 2015: 78); doing ‘the right thing’ becomes an act of rebellion and self-affirmation 
against the structures of the institution. Ethics emerge from this writing as embodied, 
subjective, affectual and emotional (Pullen and Rhodes, 2015; Rhodes, 2012), part of the 
work of constituting one’s own moral subjectivity (Munro, 2014). The ethical practitioner is 
the reflexive one (Hibbert and Cunliffe, 2015); the ethical impulse is interpersonal and 
relational (Tyler, 2019).  
This decidedly un-sociological account of ethics as a subjective, individually 
embodied property reflects a more general neglect of the topic within mainstream sociology. 
Talcott Parsons is often blamed for the long exile of morality from sociology; the study of 
morality was, before Parsons, central to the sociological endeavour. Durkheim (1957) 
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regarded the moral turpitude of industry as a problem of organization, specifically the 
presence of certain kinds of social arrangements based around competition. Against the 
backdrop of a more elaborate account of the division of labour and the emergence of 
variegated professional ethics in society, Durkheim advocated the organization of industrial 
processes into corporations capable of reintegrating the moral realm with the economic 
(Steeman, 1963).  Max Weber had understood morals as social facts amenable to empirical 
investigation and an important part of the discipline’s remit (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013). With 
the discipline growing averse to grand theory, ‘because morality was identified so strongly 
with Parsonian theory, it went down with the functionalist ship’, as Hitlin and Vaisey (2013: 
53) neatly put it. The psychological sciences, meanwhile, have pursued a vigorous research 
programme that conceptualises morality as an evolutionary adaptation. Bykov (2019: 12) 
reviews this literature and concludes that it ‘leads to a considerable fragmentation of the very 
idea of morality, which now looks like just little more than a capacity to evaluate hypothetical 
scenarios’. Eroded from all sides, the sociological content of morality is at stake, and scholars 
have begun to call for a ‘new sociology of morality’ that takes seriously the divergence of 
morality across groups, places and times (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013).  
Disciplinary antecedents in classical sociology, a more modern sociological aversion 
to theorizing morals, a distrust of organizational settings and – related to this – a 
contemporary account of individualised ethics that draws from post-modern theory and 
feminist critique (Collins and Wray-Bliss, 2005; Pullen and Rhodes, 2015; Tyler, 2019) have 
led to a position where the literature has scarcely begun to explore the material dimensions of 
morality. This absence is striking in view of the increased attention that scholars of 
organization have paid to materiality in recent years. Authors from the science and 
technology studies tradition (Haraway, 1985; Latour, 1999; Mol, 2002) and mainstream 
organizational theory (Barad, 2003; Fokati et al., 2014, Leonardi, 2013b; Orlikowski, 2007) 
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have sought to emphasise the importance of the material, stressing in different ways its 
agential and ontological entanglement with the social. Increasingly, matter matters to 
organization theory (Carlile et al., 2013); when it comes to the analysis of organizational 
morality, however, matter does not yet seem to matter.  
The present paper seeks to counter that absence through the analysis of an empirical 
case, a small-scale stock market for high-growth companies, founded in London in 1995 and 
active until the financial crisis of 2008. Developing the insights of scholars such as Mercier-
Roy and Mailhot (2019) and Ben Khaled and Gond (2019), the paper draws on the science 
and technology studies (STS) inflected social studies of markets (Çalışkan and Callon, 2010; 
MacKenzie, 2009) to explore how multiple and often contradictory organizational moralities 
are performed through agency-filled ‘socio-technical assemblages’ (Orlikowski, 2007), or 
‘agencements’  (Callon, 2008). It theorises material devices as ethical generators (Preda, 
2006) to present an ‘ecological reading’ (Mercier-Roy and Mailhot, 2019) of the performance 
of morality in its empirical site. The paper shows that the market’s normative moral orders – 
being the notions of acceptable practice, worth, and value held in common within a given 
community – arise in dialectic between the social and the material, embedded in the 
sociomaterial infrastructures of the exchange. Unlike the high-level ‘orders of worth’ 
envisaged by Boltanski and Thevenot (2006), the moral orders identified are locally specific 
and fragmented; they remain subject to challenge from rival orders embedded in rival 
mechanisms of trading. By this account, moral orders require considerable work, and are 
specific, contested and temporary; they are social facts deserving of empirical study, as 
Weber understood (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013).  
Understanding morality as organizational and material, rather than personal, dovetails 
with other concerns in the literature. Sociologists have in recent years become aware of the 
micro-political contestations ‘congealed’ into the design of markets (MacKenzie, 2018); I 
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emphasise the ethical dimensions of such struggles, a topic of pressing relevance for those 
interested in the organization, or reorganization, of markets (Brunsson and Jutterström, 
2018). My argument suggests that such contestations have moral aspects, and that they shape 
the moral agency of market participants. Notions of good are local, specific and historically 
dependent, a claim that problematizes accounts of morality as individual and embodied 
prevalent in the literature, and augments the defence of formal organization and the ethics of 
office (du Gay, 2000; du Gay, 2008). The article continues to advance our understanding of 
the role of the material in organizations, extending the powerful concept of ‘sociomateriality’ 
to the domain of organizational ethics, and highlighting the ethically generative capacity of 
the sociomaterial architectures of the markets. To paraphrase Orlikowski (2007), materiality 
and morality are ‘constitutively entangled’: for those interested in organizations and ethics, 
whether as scholars, managers, or both, matter matters a great deal.  
 
Ethics and organizations: the classical and critical traditions  
 The fathers of classical sociology, Durkheim and Weber especially, understood the 
ethical problems facing organizations and commerce. Durkheim saw ethics as a resource – as 
potential solutions to social problems – specifically the anomie of barbarous industrialization 
that threatened, in his view, to overcome society. Durkheim had tackled Spencer’s assertion 
of competitive egoism as the basis for moral organization, claiming instead that deeper social 
structures held mankind above the state of continuous, self-interested warfare (Steeman, 
1963). He recognised that professional ethics were specific to categories of employment and 
dependent upon the structural organization of those professions, ‘as many forms as morals as 
there are different callings’ (Durkheim, 1957: 5). It is likely, he argued, that professional 
ethics will be more developed and more advanced, the greater the stability and the better the 
organization of the professional group in question. In the case of industry and trade, the lack 
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of organization means that scarcely any professional ethics exist in the whole sector. This line 
of argument led him to call for the organization of business into corporations which, like the 
mediaeval guilds, would be able to reintegrate the moral and professional aspects of life 
(Hendry, 2001). Weber was equally fascinated with the constitution of organizational ethics, 
the inescapable ‘iron cage’ of formal-rational calculation. He famously noted that ‘the 
objective discharge of business primarily means the discharge of business according to 
calculable rules and without regard for persons’ (Weber, 1978). This phrase, inverted by 
Bauman (1989), has led a critique that sees Weber as privileging formal over substantive 
rationality. As du Gay (2000) makes clear, this is unjustified, for Weber recognised the 
ethical contradictions inherent in bureaucratic logics; like Durkheim, he saw the ethical 
‘character’ as dependent upon a given situation. 
This sense has fallen out of more recent scholarship on organizational ethics. 
Although Weber’s dehumanised bureaucrat is an ideal type far removed from the complicated 
person holding the office, Bauman (1989) used it as a polemical device to accuse bureaucracy 
of creating moral distance and a purely technical responsibility. Scholars have followed 
Bauman’s lead, seeing morality as individual and subjective, and set against the rule-bound 
frameworks of rational organization (Jackall, 2010; Jones, 2003; Rhodes and Wray-Bliss, 
2013). Critically inclined researchers, setting out from the entirely reasonable empirical 
observation that many organizations do go bad, have offered increasingly subtle and 
sophisticated accounts of how organizational norms can be corrupted. Brannan (2017) 
presents an ethnographic study of financial services mis-selling, showing the ritualised nature 
of toxic organizational culture. Others have focused on narratives of self-justification and 
their consequences (Collins and Wray-Bliss, 2005; Whittle and Mueller, 2012). McMurray et 
al. (2011) offer an account of ethics as a means of moral agency and freedom in 
organizations, while Munro (2014) argues that ethics should be understood as a spiritual 
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discipline through which novel subjectivities can arise, a means of resisting the discursive 
disciplining demanded by employers (Halsall and Brown, 2013). For Weiskopf and Willmott 
(2013), ‘ethics’ is most properly understood as a mode of individual agency displayed in the 
face of organizational power structures, norms and moral orders. As Eggebø (2013) writes, 
‘emotions have no place in bureaucratic practice; the professional bureaucrat is required to 
control emotional reactions and resist emotional involvement in order to realize the principle 
of equal treatment’. But only up to a point. Eggebø’s study of immigration officials shows 
them operating a kind of ethical doublethink, where ethics spring from their emotional 
responses, offering a means of negotiating the often blurred lines of formal organization. In 
the same way, Pullen and Rhodes (2015: 160) suggest that ‘affectual relations, care, 
compassion or any other forms of feeling that are experienced pre-reflexively through the 
body’ form the basis for ethical agency.  
Much of the contemporary critical literature of ethics and organization is, therefore, 
distinguished by its determination to move away from rational-philosophical accounts of 
ethics, critiqued as thinly-disguised regimes of domination, embedded in relations of gender 
as well as race (Contu, 2018; Knights, 2015; Tyler, 2019). The ethical subject is one who 
manages to articulate a moral position within the confines of organizational action; ethical 
responsibility becomes a feat of rebellion (McMurray et al., 2011). Moreover, where classical 
sociology recognized the functional specialization of professional ethics, ethics that 
emphasise their claim on the individual as a whole must be universal and consistent: ‘The 
possibility of  categories and practices of personhood’, writes du Gay (2008: 132), 
‘expressing distinctive ethical comportments, irreducible to common principles, appears quite 
foreign to those for whom a common or universal form of moral judgement is held to reside 
in the figure and capacities of the self-reflective person’.  
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Ethics and the (socio)material 
Treating morality as an individual property ignores the ‘obvious fact’ (Bykov, 2019: 7) that 
moral frameworks differ between groups, a phenomenon that characterises morality as a 
sociological problem and one that becomes acute in the study of organizations. A sociological 
analysis of a more Weberian kind – treating ethics as social facts worthy of study – may seek 
to investigate the social processes behind given sets of morals understood as belonging ‘more 
to cross-cutting groups…religions, occupations, generations, educational categories, 
organizations, and social movements’ (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013: 53). In this vein, economic 
sociologists have shown markets to be sites of moral work, legitimizing certain activities and 
erecting boundaries between others (see, for example Healy, 2004; Zelizer, 2005). Such 
scholars have largely focused on the discursive and cultural framings of markets and market 
boundaries (de Goede, 2005). Empirical studies have also emphasised the cultural 
construction of particular kinds of agency (e.g. Ailon 2018). Scholars have insisted on the 
agency of individuals over and above the tools that they use. Svetlova (2012) argues that 
institutional practices may greatly inhibit the performative power of financial models, while 
Beunza’s (2019) study of Wall Street morals suggests that models lead to a moral 
disengagement that must be countered by interpersonal relations. Cultural framings will 
necessarily differ between sites, and actors may inhabit multiple moral persona. This is well 
theorized by Boltanski and Thevenot (2006), who propose the existence of rival orders of 
worth. In their theory, actors infer social norms – what is valued, what is (un)worthy – from 
‘principles of coherence present both in the mental schemas of individuals and in the 
arrangement of objects, persons’ (145). Actors may shift from one order of worth to another, 
depending on social situation: for example, the industrial order, which dominates the 
workplace and factory, has different values from the civic or domestic orders. Boltanski and 
Thevenot’s intention is to produce a high-level schema of modes of justification in political-
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social discourse, ‘moving back and forth between classical constructions of political 
philosophy and justifications produced by actors in disputes…to construct a solid link 
between political philosophy and sociology’ (14).  
The present article proposes another approach – a ‘flank movement’ (Muniesa, 2011) 
– to the understanding of ethics in organizations. It follows Mercier-Roy and Mailhot’s 
(2019) endeavour to move beyond the discursive strategies of morality to examine the 
‘concrete recomposition of laws, conventions, devices, persons’ – the ‘agencement’ of human 
and non-human actors that give meaning to action and settle ‘the common good’. The term 
‘agencement’, borrowed from the STS-inflected study of markets (Callon, 2008; Çalışkan 
and Callon, 2009) signifies an arrangement of human actors, material devices and 
organizational practices, inscribed with certain knowledges and capable of action as a single 
entity. The agencement enhances the cognition of individuals, distributing (Hutchins, 1995) it 
across this heterogeneous array of devices. Thus a hedge fund comprising people, telephones, 
machines, and an outsourced back office can be productively theorized as an agencement 
(Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007). The present article invokes the notion of agencement as not 
just cognitive prosthesis (Callon, 2008) but also a moral one; in doing so, it extends 
organization theory’s concerns with the interrelations of materiality and sociality to the 
domain of the moral.  
An array of work within organization studies and elsewhere has contested the 
philosophical and empirical privileging of the social over the material. It is no longer novel to 
propose that the material shapes organizational life, nor indeed to argue that the material is 
itself socially constructed. Early contributions from the sociology of scientific knowledge 
demonstrated that the material is highly social, that it takes its particular form as a result of 
social processes worked into material artefacts (Pickering, 1992). Actor Network Theory 
sought to distribute agency across ontologically flat, heterogeneous ‘agencements’ (Callon, 
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2008), often termed ‘assemblages’ in organization theory (e.g. Orlikoski, 2007).2 Latour 
(2002) highlighted the ethical consequences of such a move, seeking to decompose the 
bifurcated ontologies of fact/value and end/means, artificial categories imposed by the 
intellectual disciplines of modernity. For Latour (1993) the endeavour of separation has never 
been wholly successful: we have never been modern.  
A parallel approach is taken by those scholars in organization theory who follow 
Barad to suggest that organizations are neither social nor material but ‘sociomaterial’, 
emerging through a ‘constitutive entanglement’ of the two domains (Orlikowski, 2007). Such 
‘agential realism’ (Barad, 2003) is first and foremost a theory of epistemology, suggesting 
that reality is produced intersubjectively in our attempts to understand it, with the material an 
ontological category separated from the social through our own ‘agential cuts’. Orlikowski 
has argued that there is no social that is not also material, and no material that is not also 
social. For Mutch (2013) and Leonardi (2013a; 2012) this is so much scholasticism. Leonardi 
argues that the conceptual entanglement of social and material occurs only after the empirical 
entanglement, and that the appropriate unit of analysis is the artefact and the people 
interacting with it and around it.  
Nonetheless, the term sociomaterial may be wielded with a lighter philosophical touch 
to denote the fundamental interconnectedness of material artefact and social practice and the 
present paper adopts such a usage. For there remains an area of consensus around the notion 
that that the material is not a neutral substrate for human action. This insight is familiar to 
students of technology and science; technological outcomes are freighted with the power 
relations that surround their design, a point made especially strongly by feminist theorists, 
following Haraway (1985) and others. Recent scholarship has explored, for example, how 
moral work buried in algorithms creates moral consequences, reinforcing or undercutting 
ethical principles. It reshapes the provision of care in acute medical settings (Roscoe, 2015) 
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or the life chances of individuals (Fourcade and Healy, 2013). Moral technologies have been 
theorized as disciplinary devices productive of everyday life. The Rich Dad Poor Dad board 
game, for example, is revealed as a technology of neo-liberal economic citizenship by 
Fridman (2016). In an important precursor to the present study, Mercier-Roy and Mailhot 
(2019) take up the concept of agencement to explore how the Uber app has reconfigured 
notions of appropriate behaviour around the taxi industry. They invoke the notion of 
agencement to provide an ‘ecological’ account of the orders of worth (Boltanski and 
Thevenot, 2006) that evolve and settle around the app. Mercier-Roy and Mailhot (2019) 
emphasise controversies as moments of ethical change and discontinuity that offer points of 
entry for analysis. Such controversies often become apparent as the process of automation 
forces participants to make explicit the norms underpinning market action (Muniesa, 2008; 
Pardo-Guerra, 2019). So, for example, Grossman et al. (2006) examine the implementation of 
an electronic system in the Paris bourse in terms of ‘transparency’, a polyvalent concept 
embedded in rival discourses of justification. On the one hand brokers demanded 
transparency of identity in order to know with whom they were transacting; on the other, the 
bankers argued that transparency of the order book (i.e. anonymity of counterparties) would 
facilitate efficient pricing. The authors distinguish between concepts of transparency: a literal 
transparency, being transparency of network relationships, and an abstract transparency, an 
informational transparency that aids processing.  
From these studies emerges a recognition of the dialectic between the material and the 
moral. There can be no separation between technology and morality, between ends and 
means (Latour and Venn, 2002). The material, as Preda (2006: 775) argues, has ‘agential 
features, which, while allowing for standardizing routines, open up supplementary paths of 
institutional intervention’. Preda’s study of the invention of the tickertape and the resulting 
transformation of financial markets theorizes it as a ‘generator’, a device able to reinforce 
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temporal structures, visualisation modes, representational and interpretive languages, 
cognitive tools and categories, and group boundaries. The ticker becomes a time generator, a 
generator of cognitive tools, and a device for the organization of knowledge; from the ticker 
flow new ways of seeing and doing in the markets and new conceptions of what appropriate 
action might be. Moral standards and orders emerge from new material apparatus or from 
controversies around notions such as transparency or safety; they may be held in place by 
material apparatus; they may prove sticky and persist even after new sociomaterial 
arrangements give rise to new articulations of the moral. In organizational settings, the 
stabilization of morality ‘can only ever be partial and temporary…frames of valuation 
persistently overflow and must be reframed’ (Roscoe, 2015: 117). Through a case study this 
article will explore such a dialectic in action. 
 
Methodology  
Data were collected as part of a larger project to write a ‘historical sociology’ 
(MacKenzie and Millo, 2003) of two stock markets founded in London in the 1990s. 3 A 
historical sociology focuses on the social and technical/material interactions that gave rise to 
the formation of these markets, a deliberate counterpoint to accounts focusing on individual, 
institutional entrepreneurs and regulatory change (e.g. Posner, 2009). The perspective of 
material sociology presupposes an actor network ontology (Latour, 2007) and a 
methodological injunction to follow the actors, be they screens, notebooks, individuals or 
European directives, through the data (Latour, 1988). Such analysis leads to a richly 
descriptive, narrative account, the basis for this case study.  
I did not initially set out to chart the moral orders of these markets. Normative 
accounts of market operation emerged – unexpectedly – throughout the interviews. They 
appeared both as justifications, operating as relatively high level ‘orders of worth’ (Boltanski 
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and Thevenot, 2006) and as much more specific articulations of proper conduct and moral 
value within the markets, the ‘moral orders’ of this paper. Interviewees spoke not only of 
what they did or should have done, but also of how appropriate courses of action emerged 
within the affordances of the sociomaterial arrangements of the marketplace. Press releases 
and newspaper commentary speaks of aspirations and expectations, while company 
disclosures offer a terse, timestamped, commentary on progress. Through a historical 
perspective, it is possible to follow moral orders through a process of social and technological 
development (a new trading platform, perhaps) to a retrospective analysis of their success, or 
otherwise. 
Over a period of 18 months, I conducted 54 interviews with 39 participants, totalling 
73 hours; I interviewed almost all of the major participants in the new markets.4 Many 
interviews were conducted on a named basis appropriate to the historical nature of the project 
(see appendix i). Where interviewees requested anonymity, usually because they were more 
junior colleagues still working in the sector, it has been necessary to anonymize an entire 
group (e.g. ‘market executive 1/2/3’). I recorded and transcribed interviews or recorded them 
with field notes; reasons for using notes rather than transcriptions included awkward or noisy 
interviewing locations, sensitive interviews and in one instance disability. Field notes were 
extensively augmented immediately after the interview. Personal communications and 
informal conversations also contributed.  
Access to elite interviews often requires existing contacts in the field.5  I had worked 
as a financial journalist after graduating and had encountered OFEX at the apogee of the 
market’s fortunes during the dot-com era. I also encountered PLUS while working as a 
jobbing copywriter to fund a PhD and a young family. My academic interest in the sociology 
of markets owes much to these experiences and, in due course, I came to recognise an 
intuition that the birth of the small-company markets in 1990s London was an episode worth 
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documenting. I had maintained contact with one corporate advisor, a personal friend, who 
was able to facilitate introductions. I was also remembered by some market participants, 
notably Jonathan Jenkins who persuaded the family to cooperate, opening up the tight 
personal networks around the market. My position as former group member led to interviews 
that flowed easily, assuming shared languages and cognitive resources (Miller and Glassner, 
1997) and yet I found myself distanced by over a decade of academic training and work, 
enjoying what Goodall (2010) terms ‘perspective by incongruity’. I have reflected elsewhere 
on the process of data collection and writing in such a setting, as well as the responsibilities it 
incurs (Roscoe and Loza, 2019).  
Interviews followed a strategy of oral history (Yow, 2005), seeking to elaborate 
individual careers and spark recollections of key events. Oral narratives make reference to 
cultural and moral norms and provide a rich source for a researcher seeking to unpack these 
issues.  This paper’s underlying historical-sociological method sought to access the – now 
lost – material dimension of these markets through the memories of participants, 
supplemented by other kinds of material. Interviews, suggests Perks (2010: 40), ‘have proved 
particularly effective at documenting the minutiae of repetitive daily routine and everyday 
practices, those which have often disappeared and might not otherwise be recorded’. 
Similarly, Yow (2005) argues that oral histories, built up through ‘active interviewing’ 
(Holstein and Gubrium, 1997), will go beyond the scope of public records and help the 
researcher to discern the power structures embedded within existing narratives. There are 
pragmatic motivations as well, for in the absence of letters, diaries and other such archival 
material – rarely maintained by organizations – interviews become an increasingly important 
source. For the present paper, justifications and partialities may even be an advantage; oral 
history is particularly useful in unpacking organizational norms and culture (Perks, 2010) 
which surface incidentally in the telling of other, more political stories.  
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I made use of textual sources as a complement to interview accounts and a means of 
triangulation. Textual sources amounted to over 1000 pages and included newspaper articles, 
company documents, prospectuses and annual reports, newsletters and lobbying materials, 
regulatory disclosures, press releases, photographs and marketing materials. These resources 
offered an accurate chronology of events, additional insight into strategy, justification and 
motivation of firms and individuals, and information on the technical arrangements and 
ambitions of markets. Documents are in the most part backgrounded in the case study and are 
more systematically referenced in the narrative account of the markets’ formation available 
on an institutional repository (Roscoe, 2017). A draft of the narrative account was circulated 
to interviewees and provoked a further round of discussions.  
Data collection and analysis ran concurrently, following a process of systematic 
combining, iterating between the existing literature and the evolving empirical understanding 
and analytical insights (Charmaz, 2006; Dubois and Gadde, 2002). Data were coded in 
nVivo, with codes motivated by the existing concerns of the STS-inflected study of markets 
and emergent themes in the data. As a strategy of following actors suggests, coding focused 
on specific individuals, episodes and technologies as well as practice, expertise and 
normative judgements. Crucially, normative statements were entangled with discussions of 
everyday practice and the infrastructure within which that took place. A corporate adviser 
might describe the obligations attached to preparing a company for market in terms of the 
practicalities of preparing the documentation, and the material shape and demands of that 
document. In order to follow the actors through the data it was necessary to take a 
phenomenological, rather than discursive, approach to the interview material; to treat 
accounts of artefacts and processes as representative of the lived experience of market 
participants (Cope, 2005). Normative claims were, therefore, treated as such and the two 
moral orders (and justifications) discussed below were abstracted by a reading across the 
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codes. Competition is valorized across multiple interview transcripts and documents; the term 
intervention appears only once (in an interview with Jonathan Jenkins) but encapsulates a 
particular set of trading practices described by those participating in matched bargain trading 
or market-making. A coding summary is provided in Appendix ii. 
 
Moral economies and trading technologies 
The paper considers the evolution of trading practices – and associated moralities – as 
technological and social change reshaped OFEX, from the early 1990s through to the late 
2000s. The exchange went by three names during that period: it was established in 1991 as JP 
Jenkins Ltd, took the name OFEX in 1995, and was renamed PLUS in 2004. Each stage of 
the exchange’s development embodies a specific set of trading practices, embedded in 
particular material technologies and associated with a specific moral order, these latter 
usefully analysed in terms of Grossman et al. (2006)’s taxonomy of literal and abstract 
transparency. As JP Jenkins Ltd it undertook matched bargain trading, an archaic practice 
that stands as a counterfactual to the electronic training by that point common across the 
London markets (Pardo-Guerra, 2010). As OFEX, the market attempted, with limited 
success, to open itself up to competing market-makers. As PLUS, it employed sophisticated 
computer systems built by the American exchange NASDAQ to resist the encroachment of 
electronic ‘order book’ trading from the London Stock Exchange’s junior market AIM. The 
paper explores the material architectures of markets as ‘generators’, offering temporalities, 
cognitive tools (ways of seeing and understanding in the market), and ways of organising 
knowledge. In each case the exchange’s sociomaterial arrangements  co-produced specific 
conceptions of ‘the right thing’. These moral orders remain sticky, persisting even after new 
sociomaterial arrangements begin to generate new market norms. The resulting story is one of 
temporary stability, overflow, contestation and reframing (Geiger and Gross, 2018). 
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i. The virtues of intervention: matched bargains, notebooks and ‘my word is my bond’  
From the 1970s onwards the London Stock Exchange (LSE) allowed member firms to trade 
in unlisted securities (i.e. the shares of private companies) under its Rule 163.2 (later 
renamed Rule 535.2 and 4.2). This exemption allowed the LSE to be seen to be supporting 
the entrepreneurial aspirations of the UK by supporting smaller, growing firms, and at the 
same time discharging its regulatory responsibilities to more established listed companies. 
This trading took place within the LSE’s established sociomaterial architectures, conducted in 
the Exchange’s great domed hall. Brokers circulated among ‘jobbers’ (the anachronistic title 
for market-makers) who stood at rickety ‘pitches’, wooden boards on which were chalked the 
prices of stocks. Trading was conducted through a complicated verbal ritual (Pardo-Guerra, 
2010) anchored by the solid materiality of paper sheets, notebooks and account books. As 
Buckland and Davis (1989) note, when dealing in smaller company stocks, ‘such modest 
volumes of stock are available as to render the concept of liquidity, if not meaningless, a very 
unlikely attribute of most OTC securities’; one can draw a stark contrast here between the 
illiquid market in junior stocks and the vast, hyper-liquid global bond markets, over-the-
counter but anchored by phone and screen (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2002).  Low volumes 
necessitated ‘matched bargain’ trading, storing up orders and negotiating between buyers and 
sellers in return for a commission on the bargain. In these sets of trading practices the many 
notebooks function as generators: as a time generator, a generator of cognitive tools, and a 
device for the organization of knowledge. Just as open outcry pits concentrated liquidity in 
time and place (Zaloom, 2006), so orders accumulated in the notebook, a space that 
coordinated chains of buyers and sellers, who might often wait some time before their order 
could be filled. The notebook (see Table 1) offered tools for making the market visible, both 
managing past transactions and organizing future sales and purchases, recorded and made 
visible so that they might be conducted and tallied up. As the quotations from John Jenkins 
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and Paul Brown suggest, it was fiddly, unfashionable work, building up an order book 
through the slow accumulation of notes. ‘Noting’ and ‘fiddling’ are morally-freighted 
practices here: assisting brokers with pent up business, helping those with nowhere to go, 
even when the transaction would be unlikely and inconvenient. It also offered a means of 
surveillance and discipline, whether in the mundane daily process of checking and sorting, or 
the malevolent eye of Winterflood’s senior partner, returned from an unsuccessful lunchtime 
visit to the betting shop. 
 
Table 1. The notebook as a trading tool  
 
‘You’d finish putting all your bargains on the checking sheets then…agree your positions so you 
take your bull and bear book…and it had to agree with the position in the jobbing book…and you 
never went home at night until you had agreed your position’(Attard oral history, Anthony Jenkins) 
 
‘You would have a list of buyers and a list of sellers and you would have to try to knit them all 
together. And at the end of the day whatever you bought you had to sell, you could not go short or 
long, so you had to be completely flat and I used to love doing that… I reckon this is back in the 
early 80s… I could make a grand a day out of those, which was matching, matching and matching.  
Nobody else wanted to do it, nobody else wanted to fill the forms out, run round and you would 
fiddle about…But for a grand a day, in those days!’ (John Jenkins interview) 
 
He would say, ‘What have you done?’ I would say, ‘Well not a lot Sir but there are one or two 
things that you might like,’ and he goes across and looks at the page, of course this was in a 
book…there was one particular page and he looked at, I said ‘Have you noticed sir, so and so,’ and 
he said, ‘It only pays for the bad ones.’ (Winterflood interview) 
 
We found that a lot of brokers had pent up business in these stocks and they’d had nowhere to go… 
We never said no. We said ‘We’ll take a note’. (Brown interview). 
 
 
 
 As the Rule 163 exemption survived the upheavals of 1986’s Big Bang and the move 
to electronic trading, so did the paper-based practices that surrounded it. When, on 11 
February 1991, John Jenkins and his business partner Paul Brown launched JP Jenkins Ltd 
with a plan to trade unquoted stocks ‘over the counter’, these habits rolled into the new 
venture, ‘two guys and a sofa’ trading with pen, paper and phone (John Jenkins interview). 
Business depended on the ability to collect sufficient orders to match desired purchases and 
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sales. ‘Taking a note’ was the central sociomaterial practice of this trading regime; Jonathan 
Jenkins, John’s son, remembers ‘I’ll take a note’ as the firm’s catchphrase. Muniesa (2008) 
suggests that automation forces the disclosure of taken-for-granted organizational norms, and 
the importance of the notebook became clear when the firm finally automated its trading 
practices, commissioning a bespoke system that simply mimicked the existing arrangements 
of notebook and pencil.  
These sociomaterial arrangements are illuminating precisely because of their 
anachronism. They generate market practices and associated norms that valorise practices of 
intervention, and the associated belief that some form of intervention is required in order that 
less liquid markets function at all. Electronic trading, implemented across the LSE’s other 
markets, could supply cheap (understood in terms of small commissions and narrow spreads) 
and cost-effective exchange and settlement for the majority of stocks where reasonable 
supply and demand existed. The existence of a liquid market in standardized securities is 
itself a considerable sociological achievement depending upon a crowd of buyers and sellers 
and a degree of standardization of the traded commodity (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 
1999). In this case the paucity of orders for unquoted stocks together with the heterogeneity 
of financial instruments associated with them made it unlikely that transactions would take 
place without some kind of manual intervention. The labour of matching and physical 
intervention makes (performs) the market.  
The notebook (and trading sheets and ledgers) – replicated in electronic trading 
systems built for the business as it became more successful – is a crucial part of a moral 
agencement valorizing interventionist practices in the market. The notebook, and the practice 
of taking a note, coordinated long trains of social relationships and negotiated the competing 
obligations of the work: honesty of trading, the need to make a profit, the physical 
complexity of paper-based share settlement, and the obligations to support growing 
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companies through the issuance of stock. The notebook, as generator, offered a sociomaterial 
space in which the social could be inscribed; it is through the mundane act of writing that the 
social was, in Muniesa’s (2008) terms, ‘folded’ into the notebook. One can contrast the 
anachronistic style of trading with electronic financial markets, theorized by Knorr Cetina 
and Bruegger (2002) as globally distributed microstructures held together by screens, 
telephones and voice boxes. The distinguishing characteristic of a microstructure is its 
synchronicity, and that appears to be missing here; the temporality enacted by the notebook is 
one of distance, rather than closeness. Like Preda’s (2006) tickertape, the notebook 
telescopes time as well as geography, allowing orders to sit until a counterparty can be found. 
It organizes knowledge, presenting the market in a particular way and demonstrating what is 
worth knowing (Dussauge et al., 2015), in this case the whereabouts of supply and demand, 
the people to whom orders are attached and the conditions under which they are issued, and 
the moral order within which trading should be conducted. Table 2 articulates perspectives on 
intervention, the sociomaterial order that underpins matched bargain trading. In order to get 
trades done negotiation is needed, argues Jenkins, while other actors draw attention to the 
moral force of making the market, and doing so on a wet, windy Wednesday afternoon; of 
working hard rather than letting the computer execute trades; and of covering the entire 
market. All of these quotes draw attention to the labour involved in these operations, and the 
implicit worthiness of ‘making’ the market, as a source of moral value and, of course, 
economic profit.  
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Table 2. Perspectives on intervention 
 
‘There was one firm that said we are going to trade all of your shares, I said fine, go on and 
do it, I don’t think you are going to do very much because they have got an electronic 
matching system and I said the reason why we did not go that route is because it does not 
work, and when I look at your site I see those same stocks on that same bid and offer thing 
and nothing happens.  Whereas with ours you had physical intervention.  You had a buyer 
at, I don’t know, a pound for argument’s sake, but we would then end up with a seller at 
£1.02 £1.03 and what we were then trying to do is negotiate between those two to get a 
trade done.’ (John Jenkins interview) 
 
‘There was also a bit of argie bargie with a couple of other very large market-makers at the 
time who also played around in some of these unlisted stocks… they would get the hump 
because they’d said well, hang on a minute, we bank a proper market in all these stocks 
and you just match it up. That’s not fair, is it? And we’ve gone well…we do all the unlisted 
[i.e. cover the entire market], you just do one or two.’ (Brown interview) 
 
Who else would be willing on a wet, windy Wednesday afternoon to make a price on 
something that you have never heard of? (Winterflood interview) 
 
To sell a line of stock, a big line of stock, you have to work to place it and talk to people, 
and you cannot just plug it into a computer (Beeson interview). 
 
 
ii. Edging towards ‘competition’ and the stickiness of organizational morality  
Matched bargain trading was most suitable for the smallest and most illiquid stocks. 
Slightly larger firms benefited from the attention of ‘market-makers’. Rather than matching 
stock and taking a commission, these traders seek to buy stock cheaply and sell it at a profit; 
they are obliged to make two-way ‘bid/offer’ (buy and sell) prices and show a ‘spread’ 
between the two. Market-makers are exposed to risk through price fluctuations in stock that 
they hold and through their legal and moral commitment to execute trades at prices offered. 
The standard sociomaterial practices for this kind of trading were established by the London 
Stock Exchange during the 1970s and 1980s (Pardo-Guerra, 2010); buy and sell prices are 
displayed on market screens, with trades conducted by telephone or electronic media. As JP 
Jenkins’ business grew and began to service larger firms, including recognised household 
names such as Weetabix, it matured naturally into a market-making operation with a 
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profitable monopoly on smaller company stocks. Strategic moves by the London Stock 
Exchange, notably the launch of its own smaller-company exchange (AIM) in 1995, forced 
JP Jenkins to badge up its operations as OFEX. During the late 1990s OFEX metamorphosed 
into a small-scale, independent stock exchange dependent on new listings and external 
brokers. It became the venue of choice for many small-scale dot-com start-ups and was 
increasingly popular with retail investors. 
There now occurred a moment of contestation between the existing paternalist-
interventionist order and the competition-based logic of contemporary stock markets. 
Crucially, it was the changes in OFEX’s technical infrastructure of trading that rendered it 
subject to other forms of accountability and made interventionist trading practices hard to 
defend. OFEX had begun making prices widely available through a partnership with the 
Reuters news wire service, and yet was not living up to the mores of competitive organization 
embedded in electronic screens (Knorr Cetina and Bruegger, 2000; Zaloom, 2006). 
Regulators worried that, in the absence of competition among market-makers, retail investors 
were not enjoying ‘best execution’, that trades were not being transparently allocated to the 
cheapest bidder. In a single market-maker system this could not, by definition, be the case, 
and brokers taking work to the market were likely to ‘get a shot across our bows from the 
regulator by asking us have we given best execution’ (Hoodless interview). ‘Best execution’ 
emerges here as a regulatory mandate for a moral order based on competition (c.f. Castelle et 
al., 2016) incompatible with the single market-maker, even though (as Hoodless subsequently 
makes clear) there was not enough profit in the market for two competing traders. Moreover, 
market folk-wisdom held that the perceived lack of liquidity stemming from a single market-
maker discouraged institutional fund managers from investing in OFEX-quoted stocks. John 
Jenkins resisted the pressure for a while, aware of the limited profits available, but eventually 
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gave in. The norm of competition – of abstract transparency – triumphed, and the material 
infrastructure of trading would be forced to catch up.  
OFEX therefore raised funds of its own – £1.45 million – and moved to open up the 
market by introducing competing market-makers, i.e. to allow those wishing to transact a 
choice of execution. The exchange used the capital to develop the new systems necessary to 
facilitate the display of competing prices from multiple participants. Some in the community 
expected new business to follow, while others pointed to the need for a deeper technological 
reorganization. Table 3 illustrates how market actors expected, though in different ways, new 
systems to fundamentally change the operation of the market. There are normative statements 
and justifications at work, such as Jonathan Jenkins’ use of ‘sacrifice’ and ‘worth’ but also 
mundane expectations about credibility, ease and responsibility that accompany the 
affordances of the new technology. Vardey’s comment in particular highlights the 
entanglement of normative expectations about how a market should operate and the market’s 
sociomaterial arrangements.  In sum, while the external forces of regulation and commercial 
pressure forced a change in the structure of the exchange, everyday market practices are 
embedded in the sociomaterial agencements of trading (Hardie and MacKenzie, 2007), and a 
heavy investment in technology is required to reproduce and stabilise these new practices. A 
stock market that wishes to constantly re-perform itself as a venue for competitive trading can 
only do so through the technical and material structures that mandate competitive market 
action (Castelle et al., 2016). OFEX’s new systems had limited success in terms of delivering 
competition. Practices of market making had, like matched-bargain trading, been well 
established in the pre-digital LSE, where ‘jobbers’ displayed buy and sell prices on wooden 
boards or ‘pitches’ on the exchange floor (Pardo-Guerra, 2019). OFEX’s market-maker 
system, ‘a very rudimentary connectivity mechanism which connected those few market 
makers involved in trading OFEX stocks’ (Market executive 2), reproduced the norms of this 
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kind of trading. It seems that despite the impetus towards competition the system did not do 
enough to upset the established agencements of trading; prices remained wide enough ‘to 
drive an 18 wheel truck through’ (anonymous comment) and the new market-makers justified 
their returns by pointing to the obligations they incurred by offering prices for all the stocks 
listed on the exchange.  
 
Table 3. Perspectives on competitive (non-matching) market arrangements 
 
We thought the upside of having a multi-market-maker system and the credibility that would bring, 
would actually bring the market up to a standard.  And okay, it would hurt JP Jenkins Limited, but 
we thought it was a sacrifice worth making for the benefit of the market. (Jonathan Jenkins 
interview) 
 
Ofex announced separately that City firm Winterflood Securities would begin making a market in 
its shares by quoting, buying and selling prices. It will provide competition to Ofex's two market-
making firms and should help make shares on the exchange easier to buy and sell. (Mail on 
Sunday, 23 November 2003) 
 
The argument was always made [that] you need market makers to provide liquidity, otherwise 
there's none.  Well, I don't agree with that....SEATS [an early electronic trading system]...was an 
attempt to blend a kind of bulletin board where people would indicate interest, IOIs with market 
makers.  So it had a different set of rules. (Vardey interview) 
 
When you are launching a Stock Exchange you don’t just have technology, you don’t just have a 
trading platform. All your market-makers and brokers have to connect to the platform. That 
platform has to connect to your website and it also has to connect to data vendors like Reuters, 
Bloomberg and so on.  It has got to connect separately to your surveillance system, so that you can 
monitor it, and it has not got to go down,  ever, virtually.  It is a huge spider’s web. (Brickles 
interview) 
 
 
Again, the notion of ‘generator’ is useful for theorizing this outcome. The new system 
performed and framed the market as a site encompassing the trading books of market makers 
and their broker clients. It offers a temporality that is more immediate than that of matching, 
but far from instantaneous. It offers a more transparent, though not perfectly competitive, 
presentation of market knowledge in the form of multiple bid/offer prices displayed on the 
connected screens and reported through OFEX’s proprietary news service, Newstrack. This 
midway position comprised a moral order that hybridised notions of intervention and 
competition, of literal and abstract transparency (Grossman et al., 2006). It evoked both the 
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best-execution defences of competitive order-processing via market makers, and the 
reputational reassurances of the brokers network, tied to named individuals. In doing so, the 
material system reproduced the norms of intervention embedded in the notebooks, repeatedly 
justified by interviewees. It did not, as the Jenkins family hoped, usher in a new level of 
credibility. Instead, in valorizing the moral order based on intervention, entrenched in the 
powerful sociomaterial networks of trading (Latour, 1988) it made possible a market coup, a 
realignment of the primary business flow away from Jenkins to rivals such as Winterflood 
Securities, a prominent small-company market maker. For the Jenkins family the move to 
competing market-makers jeopardized the only part of the business that had been reliably 
profitable, and in 2004 the family lost control of the business after a failed fundraising. 
iii. Competition arrives? New systems and dark pools 
Large-scale electronic stock exchanges rely upon order book systems where traders lodge buy 
and sell orders and these are matched algorithmically. Electronic order books perform a 
moral order that valorizes efficiency; electronic matching of orders ensures low costs and 
narrow spreads (between bid and offer prices). These trading systems are used without 
exception for the stocks of larger companies where a much greater turnover of stock means 
that there is likely to be a congruence of buy and sell orders (Lee, 1998). For less liquid 
stocks, however, the decision to implement order books is politically fraught. During the 
early 2000s, the LSE sought to expand the operation of its order books into its junior markets 
and this provoked conflict with the existing market-maker community, who advocated 
intervention-based trading and, crucially, resented the fees charged by the LSE: ‘people hated 
the LSE. It was…vicious’ (Market executive 2).  
In 2004, Simon Brickles took over as chief executive of OFEX. He had previously 
been head of the LSE’s smaller company market AIM, where he had been committed to a 
disclosure-based, caveat-emptor market. He now saw an opportunity to rebuild OFEX – now 
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renamed PLUS – as a direct competitor to AIM. Table 4 shows the firm’s changing attitudes 
to competition with the LSE, a possibility that itself depended on European regulation that 
sought to create a market in stock exchange services. Before 2004, the management had been 
certain that competition with the LSE would be foolhardy, a ‘fight with the biggest gorilla in 
the room’ as one executive put it; under new management the market adopts a morally-
charged discourse of unseating a ‘monopoly’ and using legal action to overthrow ‘anti-
competitive practices’ where the LSE was ‘taking too much of the pot’.  
A system able to challenge the LSE directly would require yet more investment in 
technical systems, and Brickles commissioned a £6.5m platform from American exchange 
NASDAQ. The sociological study of markets has long recognized that liquidity and 
competition are organizational, sociomaterial achievements (Carruthers and Stinchcombe, 
1999; MacKenzie, 2009) and the new market infrastructure acted as generator for 
competition. It offered a synchronistic temporality, with simultaneous connection of market 
participants, data vendors and surveillance; it offered traders ways of making sense of the 
market through screens and workstations (c.f.  Knorr Cetina, 2005). It performs not just 
competition between market-makers but between market operators, subjecting market 
operators to the norms ascendant in the stock markets themselves, and increasingly ascendant 
in regulatory frameworks with the EU’s ambition to offer a market in markets. Alongside the 
market-maker driven service for smaller firms, PLUS now had the technological capabilities 
to compete with the LSE for market share of business conducted through order books and 
PLUS sought to make customer choice possible in a competitive market for exchange 
services. 
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Table 4. Changing perspectives on exchange-level competition 
 
Pre-2004: OFEX avoids competition with the LSE 
 
We always said to them [the LSE] look, we’re not in competition. We want these companies to 
grow and then push them onto you. (Brown interview) 
 
‘We’re not in competition with AIM,’ 54-year-old Jenkins said. (Evening Standard, 3 Oct 2000) 
 
2004 and after: OFEX/PLUS explicitly positons itself as a competitor to the LSE 
 
In February, Ofex appointed Simon Brickles, former head of AIM, as business development 
director and said it would step up competition with Aim (30 Sept 2004) 
One of the regulator’s objectives is to promote competition and so I think the regulators were very 
keen to see PLUS survive (Market Executive 2) 
 
Winterflood wanted to see us do this [offer trading in LSE stocks] because they were unhappy with 
the way...they felt they were being treated by the London Stock Exchange…The LSE was a 
monopoly, so it was not possible for people to actually compete with the LSE.  
(Market Executive 6) 
 
The LSE ended up in a situation where it had a platform that even though a lot of money was 
invested into that platform...all those new types of brokers and all that actually could not physically 
connect to the platform because that platform was too slow. So out of that, born out of a 
frustration...PLUS was about providing competition on the primary market side of things.  
(Market Executive 6) 
 
The enlarged trading service will allow brokers and investors flexibility in selecting their execution 
venue. (PLUS interim statement, September 2005) 
[The Turquoise founders were] big swinging dicks…big players, nothing to do with small company 
investing but big players…got it into their heads, probably rightly, that the LSE was taking too 
much of the pot in trading terms “We’re going to set up the alternative, we know what we’re 
doing…we’re masters of the universe, we will create an alternative dealing venue.”  
(Hazell Smith interview) 
 
If you compete with the monopoly on half of its business then it is going to switch its fees in other 
business. (Brickles interview) 
 
The only way we were going to persuade the LSE to [allow PLUS] to dual trade AIM stocks was to 
sue them. So we did. So we spent four million quid on that legal case... [Interviewer: On what basis 
did you sue them?] I think it was anti-competitive...Exactly. Anti-competitive practices. So 
effectively it was a competition law suit. 
(Market Executive 6) 
 
 
This competition came to the fore in the autumn of 2007 through the short lived and 
distracting proposal to establish a ‘dark pool’ (Lagna and Lenglet, 2019), a proprietary 
trading venue in direct competition to the LSE. In this episode, codenamed ‘Project 
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Turquoise’, a number of senior UK executives of global investment banks came together with 
the idea of setting up their own lightly regulated trading system to take their business away 
from the Exchange. By October, details were leaking out. On 6 October 2007 the Daily 
Telegraph ‘revealed’ that PLUS was negotiating the terms of a ‘takeover’ with Turquoise, 
and the Independent announced a ‘merger’. PLUS’ shares were suspended pending an 
announcement. But talks came to nothing, and the project had earned the nickname ‘Tortoise’ 
in the financial press. PLUS did eventually manage to make inroads into the LSE’s market 
share but was ultimately unsuccessful, derailed by strategic resistance from the LSE and the 
credit crisis of 2008.   
 This episode, together with PLUS’s longer term ambition of competing with the LSE, 
is based upon the presence of a market infrastructure that has been constructed to produce 
competition. It is a performation of certain ideas about market function, and reproduces 
within itself a particular kind of normative worldview. Having secured its own materially-
embedded moral orders, where the intervention needed to make markets function – 
understood in terms of ‘making a market’ by buying, holding and selling stock – remained 
the primary obligation of market actors, PLUS could now reproduce and directly challenge 
the LSE’s automated order books, with everything that entailed. Traders choosing to use 
PLUS not only are entangled in a sociomaterial system that is predicated upon and 
reproduces competitive market relations, but also engages in higher-level competitive process 
taking place between exchanges. Competition overspills from the infrastructures of 
exchanges to the relationships between them.  
 
Discussion: sociomateriality and organizational morality  
This paper has presented a historical sociology of the founding and development of a 
small-scale, British stock exchange named OFEX. The case offers a rich empirical source for 
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those wishing to explore the formation of markets. Concerns over the structure and 
organization of markets surface, as do the many factors that led to short and medium-term 
success but eventual failure. The present paper takes up a theme that emerged unexpected 
from the empirical material: the interrelation of market architecture, trading mechanism, and 
the moral orders of the markets. It argues that sociomaterial assemblages, or ‘agencements’ 
(Callon, 2008), are a crucial part of the evolution of distinct moral orders – as the concept of 
sociomateriality recognizes the ontological intertwining of the social and the material, so it 
allows us to see how moral orders emerge in a dialectic between the social (practice, 
regulation etc.) and the material (organizational structures, technological systems, and 
everyday artefacts).  
Reviewing the short and complex history of OFEX the paper offers an ‘ecological 
reading’ (Mercier-Roy and Mailhot, 2019) of the interplay between rival moral orders 
centring on intervention and competition, or literal and abstract transparency (Grossman et 
al., 2006). The first claims a lineage of practice from the face-to-face trading of the pre-
electronic London Stock Exchange and depends upon a regulatory dispensation from the 
institution. It is embedded in notebooks (later computer-based) that coordinate buyers and 
sellers and help to perform a particular kind of moral work. Market norms are, as indicated by 
previous literature, reproduced by ritual and discourse (Abolafia, 1998; Brannan, 2017); this 
study shows that they are also made possible by the generative capacity (Preda, 2006) of the 
sociomaterial arrangements of the exchanges. In the second stage of the exchange’s 
evolution, discourse and regulation have come to endorse a mode of market interaction based 
on competition. Market makers’ business practices and justifications point to earlier norms as 
their intervention-based strategies are reproduced by the material architectures of the market. 
OFEX’s management is impotent in the face of the durable agencements of trading and the 
justifications they generate. Only after a substantial further investment are the norms of 
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competition fully instantiated in the exchange’s infrastructure, and then they begin to 
overflow, leading to competition between exchanges themselves.  
The paper’s central endeavour is to draw together several important insights from 
sociology and organisational theory.  First, that markets are sites of political contestation 
where powerful actors impose their dominance on others in pursuit of ongoing profit 
(Fligstein, 1996); the STS-inflected study of markets upon which this paper draws has begun 
to recognise the importance of material structures in reproducing such contestations 
(MacKenzie, 2018). Second, that markets are designed entities, rather than natural 
occurrences (MacKenzie, 2009), a theme now prominent in organisation theory (Brunsson 
and Jutterström, 2018; Palo et al., 2020). Third, that social and political relations are 
compounded into the material: there is no material that is not social, and no social that is not 
material, writes Orlikowski (2007). The paper recognises that institutions are the result of the 
summing up of micro-level sociomaterial interactions (Latour, 2007) that comprise not only 
political struggles but also moral ones. Throughout the story of OFEX, the market’s material 
structures are constantly under negotiation, designed and redesigned by actors according to 
competing understandings of good practice. Market design (Mackenzie, 2009; Mackenzie, 
2018) is therefore a consequence of moral orders in the marketplace. But it is also a source of 
moral order: the study shows how material structures, densely patterned with social codes, 
organize conduct within the markets. The paper theorizes these as ethical ‘generators’ (Preda, 
2006), providing actors with the cognitive schemas and calculative tools for moral action. 
Conceptions of worth (efficiency or intervention) are not transcendent or a priori, nor are they 
purely embodied; it is not clear that they are even meaningful out of context; they are local 
and specific and entangled with the sociomaterial arrangement of the market. The study here 
makes a significant contribution to the economies of worth literature (Boltanski and 
Thevenot, 2006; Mercier-Roy and Mailhot, 2019) by establishing that moral orders within 
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institutions are specific, local and limited to their context, be that a workplace, markets, or 
organisations.  
It follows, therefore, that organizations cannot be understood as morally toxic yet 
peopled by the occasional virtuous free spirit. Much current scholarship on morality in 
organizational settings would suggest just this, arguing that moral rectitude is dependent upon 
developing an individual, subjective ethical agency that is free from the corrosive restrictions 
of organizational accountabilities and bureaucratic structures (Ailon, 2018; Eggebø, 2013; 
Rhodes and Wray-Bliss, 2013). My account of the sociomaterial dimension of morality 
supplements du Gay’s (2000; 2008) spirited rehabilitation of Weber, a contrary voice in this 
debate. du Gay sees organizational settings as containing their own distinctive moral 
character, or ethics of office. To do the right thing is to do what the office demands, 
irrespective of one’s personal ethos. I have argued that such ethos of office – a local, specific 
moral order – is inscribed into the sociomaterial arrangements of the market, and that there is 
always a political and historical dimension to the design and organisation of such 
arrangements. On this basis one must doubt whether it is possible for the critically-minded, 
virtuous soul to exist at all: the constitutive entanglement of morals and materials would seem 
to preclude the kind of embodied and effectual ethics envisaged by critical scholars.  
My argument suggests that notions of professionalization as a moral panacea are 
problematic. Durkheim (1957) exempts trade and industry from his systems of professional 
ethics, protesting that its loose organization means that an entire sector of society is left 
without a moral code. He, and others since, have advocated professional codes of conduct as 
a cure for moral turpitude (Hendry, 2001; Rubin and Dierdhorff, 2013). This approach 
neglects the ethically generative capacity of sociomaterial structures, positing morals as the 
property of atomised intellects, and its supposition that the manager can transcend the 
sociomaterial structures of moral decision making in organizations is problematic (Roscoe, 
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2020) . On the other hand, it might be that Durkheim is unduly pessimistic on the moral 
codes of trade and industry: material arrangements are mechanisms by which individual 
sectors might achieve coordinated, if specific, moral capacity. Such a recognition has the 
potential to inform ongoing debates in organizational studies, notably the discussions of 
critical performativity that have featured prominently in this journal (Cabantous et al., 2016; 
Wickert and Schaefer, 2015). It shows that scholars wishing to make a difference in 
organizational culture should seek to influence the sociomaterial structures of the 
organization as well as its discourses and rhetoric; there are similar implications for managers 
wishing to organize in accordance with particular moral goals. 
Organizational morals are necessarily variegated, as both Durkheim and Weber 
observed, ‘expressing distinctive ethical comportments’ (du Gay, 2008: 132). A sociological 
approach that treats morals as social facts to be investigated is predicated on empirical work 
at the level of the institution rather than the individual. Hitlin and Vaisey (2013: 55) 
distinguish between ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ morality, the latter a ‘richer array of virtues and vices, 
like dignity, hospitality, exploitation, fanaticism, and piety… what kind of person (or society) 
it is good to be.’ My account has focused on the second category: underlying understandings 
of how markets should function, reproduced in the sociomaterial apparatus of the exchange. 
OFEX’s  history is shaped by a contest between two of these understandings. On the one 
hand, a paternalist vision of the market as requiring considerable, expensive human 
intervention for trades in growing companies to take place, justified by the contribution made 
to the national economy and structured by a literal transparency of visible network relations. 
On the other, a vision of free competition that embraces ‘best execution’, an abstract 
transparency, openness, and efficiency, justified by the protection of eventual consumers. 
Thin morality, conceptions of what is appropriate in particular situations, flows from these 
deeper understandings: by the paternalist view it is unacceptable to exploit gullible investors, 
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while these same must tread carefully in a competitive, caveat emptor market; the LSE is 
‘hated’ on account of its restrictive practices and rent-seeking while Brickles’ attempt to 
establish ‘a high temple of capitalism’ is widely praised. These are moral facts (Durkheim, 
1957). It is against this backdrop that one of OFEX’s chief executives – Jonathan Jenkins – 
could make his emotive claim, ‘we did what we thought was right for the market’. 
 The paper therefore offers an organizational contribution to the growing ‘new 
sociology of morality’ (Hitlin and Vaisey, 2013: 54), a Weberian approach to the analysis of 
morals that explores not only historical context of specific moralities, but also the ‘social 
processes that create and sustain particular conceptions of morality’. More importantly, it 
argues that particular conceptions of morality inform not only social processes, but the 
material arrangement of organizations, and that this in turn reproduces sustains moral orders. 
The paper urges researchers to become sensitised to the dialectic between the material and the 
moral: to recognize that matter matters in our understanding of ethics and organizations.   
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moral philosophy (e.g. Williams, 2000) 
2 The word ‘assemblage’ is a Francophone pun on the materialities of everday life (Hardie 
and MacKenzie, 2007). Anglo-Saxon organization theory prefers ‘assemblage’ although 
these terms may be used interchangeably. Both derive from Deleuze and Guattari’s ‘A 
Thousand Plateaus’ (1987) and their concept of ‘rhizomic’ system of organization: 
horizontal, non-hierarchical, centreless, without stable patterns of interconnection (Bogue, 
2008). 
3  Throughout this paper I will refer to the firms supervising, regulating, and conducting 
settlement in, securities trade as ‘stock exchanges’, and the broader domain of the trade in 
securities as ‘stock markets’, in line with the conventional definition. Stock markets may be 
subdivided into individual domains, for example demarcated by particular listing rules, or 
different exchanges. I shall refer to each domain as ‘a market’. 
4 ‘Almost all’ is a necessary caveat. In practice I was able to interview all of the participants 
that I wished with the exception of one former chief executive of the London Stock Exchange  
5 Access to these elite interviewees was gained through a combination of personal 
recommendation, formal approaches by email and cold-calling. The latter was particularly 
effective because the sector still makes heavy use of the telephone and because it was 
possible to swiftly exchange the bona fides of existing interviewees. A typical pattern of 
contact might run: introductory email containing information about the project and consent 
and ethics declarations (ignored); a quick telephone call and a positive introduction; a 
resending of the initial email and an arrangement of interview by email. 
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Appendix i:  Interviews 
Interviews were conducted during the period December 2015 to May 2017. * denotes multiple 
interviews. Interviews were conducted on the record unless requested otherwise. Anonymity, where 
requested, required the anonymizing of groups e.g. ‘market executive’. 
 
Name/Pseudonym Role 
Andrew Beeson Founder Beeson Gregory, broker, Chairman of Schroders 
Andrew Buchanan Fund manager 
Barry Hocken OFEX executive, Newstrack founder, small company financier 
Brian Winterflood* Founder, Winterflood Securities, market-maker 
Corporate advisor 1* Small company financier 
Corporate advisor 2* Small company financier 
Corporate advisor 4* Small company financier 
Corporate advisor 5 Small company financier 
Emma Jenkins Former MD of OFEX, daughter of John Jenkins 
Fund manager 1 Fund Manager 
Geoff Hoodless* Founder Hoodless Brennan, broker 
Gervais Williams Fund manager 
Giles Vardey* LSE Director of Market Development, Chairman of PLUS 
John Jenkins Founder, JP Jenkins, founder OFEX, former chairman of OFEX 
Jonathan Jenkins* Former MD of OFEX, son of John Jenkins 
John French Company promoter 
Marcus Stuttard* Current Head of AIM and UK Primary Markets at the LSE 
Market executive 1* Market executive 
Market executive 2 Market executive 
Market executive 3 Market executive 
Market executive 4 Market executive 
Market executive 5 Market executive 
Market executive 6* Market executive 
Market-maker 1 Market-maker 
Market-maker 2 Market-maker 
Martin Hughes Seconded to AIM launch team  
Paul Brown Cofounder JP Jenkins Ltd 
Phil Nathan Director of broking, Charles Stanley 
Promoter 2 Company promoter 
Public relations 1 Former journalist, Public relations 
Public relations 2 Public relations 
Public relations 3 Public relations 
Public relations 4 Former journalist, Public relations 
Simon Brickles Former Head of AIM, former CEO of OFEX 
Stephen Hazell-Smith* Fund manager, former Chairman of PLUS 
Stephen Norcross* Director of broking, Finncap 
Theresa Wallis* Former Head of AIM 
Tim Ward* Former member of AIM launch team, CEO of QCA 
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Appendix ii: first level data coding summary 
Advisory work and responsibilities 
Amara Dhari 
Broking 
Episodes and anecdotes 
Episodes and anecdotes\Characters (multiple 
codes) 
Episodes and anecdotes\Competitors GXG and 
535 
Episodes and anecdotes\OFEX episodes 
Episodes and anecdotes\Petra Diamonds 
Episodes and anecdotes\Turquoise 
Family business and tensions 
Fees and costs 
History 
History\AIM founding and development 
History\Commodities boom 
History\Dot com mania 
History\JP Jenkins tail 
History\Newstrack 
History\OFEX 2004 placing 
History\OFEX as ISDX at ICAP 
History\OFEX founding and development 
History\OTC and Third Market 
History\PLUS decline and fall 
History\PLUS Markets Brickles and beyond 
History\USM and its closure 
Innovative practices 
Material architectures 
Material architectures\(Non)mechanization and 
digitization 
 
Material architectures\(Non)mechanization and 
digitization\News and market information 
Material architectures\(Non)mechanization and 
digitization\Settlement 
Material architectures\(Non)mechanization and 
digitization\Trading 
Material architectures\Documents 
Over-promoted 
Performativity 
Performativity\Performative practices and 
conventions 
Performativity\Politics of performativity 
Regulation 
Regulation\1980s sell-offs, Big Bang, bull market 
etc. 
Regulation\AIM rules 
Regulation\European regulation 
Regulation\FCA (and FCA killing off markets) 
Regulation\LSE monopoly, restrictive practices, 
challenges 
Regulation\LSE Rulebook 
Regulation\OFEX regulatory position 
Reputation and legitimacy 
Role UK plc 
Running a capital market 
Running a capital market\Compliance and 
supervision 
Running a capital market\Improving competition 
Running a capital market\Institutional investors 
Running a capital market\Internationalisation 
Running a capital market\Liquidity 
Running a capital market\Private investors (Mrs 
Miggins) 
Running a capital market\Raising money 
(advisory work) 
Running a capital market\Revenue streams and 
costs 
Running a capital market\RIE 
Running a capital market\Tax advantages 
Smaller companies 
Social context 
Social context\Apprenticeships 
Social context\Hard times back in the day 
Social context\LSE as a club 
Social context\Negative sentiment and general 
criticism 
Social context\Networks and information 
Social context\Political lobbying 
Social context\Promoting the market 
Trading and market making 
Trading and market making\Corporate broking 
Trading and market making\Public relations 
Trading and market making\Sharp practices 
Values and valuation 
Values and valuation\A good business (advisory) 
Values and valuation\Affective content 
Values and valuation\Expertise 
Values and valuation\Making a fortune 
Values and valuation\Market data as valuable 
Values and valuation\Market valuations and fees 
Values and valuation\Mores and responsibilities 
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